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We examine the welfare effects of entry in the presence of network ex-
ternalities. We show that if network goods are fully incompatible, entry is
socially insufficient as long as the entry cost is high, the goods are sufficiently
differentiated, and the degree of network externality is low. Further, we show
that as the degree of compatibility between the network goods increases, in-
sufficient entry becomes more likely. Our findings provide policy guidelines
for anticompetitive and procompetitive entry regulations.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The literature on social efficiency of entry got its momentum with the influential work by Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) who show that entry is socially excessive in oligopolistic industries with scale economies.1 This is commonly
known as “excess entry theorem” which provides a rationale for anticompetitive entry regulations. Since this seminal
work, the topic of social desirability of entry has been analyzed and extended under various settings. Although Ghosh
and Saha (2007) suggest that excessive entry may also arise due to marginal cost differences, a large body of the
literature contradicts this view. For example, entry can be socially insufficient in the presence of technology licensing
(Mukherjee & Mukherjee, 2008) and trade unions (De Pinto & Goerke, 2020). Entry can also be socially insufficient if
the firms engage in cost reducing R&D (Chao et al., 2017), whether the firms enter the market sequentially or
simultaneously (Cabral, 2004) and when the market is characterized by bilateral oligopoly where the input suppliers
have market power (Ghosh & Morita, 2007a, 2007b). These findings encourage policy makers to adopt procompetitive
policies under some circumstances.
Although these papers deepen our understanding in various directions, they have traditionally ignored the
aspect of network externalities, which is an important feature in various industries in the contemporary world.
One classic example of network market is online video game industry,2 such as, Blizzard Entertainment's World
of Warcraft that provides platforms upon which developers, such as Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo, launch new
applications. Such applications are more useful and fun when used with friends, that is, the value of being part
of the network rises as the network size increases. In 2006, Blizzard Entertainment's World of Warcraft reported
that it had more than six million active users and generated $1 billion subscription revenue in 2006 (Schiesel &
Richtel, 2006). It is, therefore, not surprising to interpret that network externalities play a pivotal role on firm's
entry decision.
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The literature examining the effects of entry in the presence of network externalities is relatively sparse.
Economides (1996) showed that in a market with strong network externalities, if there exists an innovating
quantity leader, it encourages entry of its rival firms. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) developed a model of pricing
where a sole supplier of network goods deters entry. Kliemnko and Saggi (2007) studied a foreign firm's choice of
FDI as in de novo entry and acquisition in a market that is characterized by network goods.
In contrast to this literature, we study the welfare implications of free entry in an oligopolistic market in
which firms produce horizontally differentiated goods that exhibit positive consumption externalities. In par-
ticular, we analyze how the social desirability to enter a market vary when the network goods are fully in-
compatible, fully compatible, and imperfectly compatible respectively. Therefore, this paper makes an attempt
to uncover the role of network compatibility and its interplay with the degree of network externality in de-
termining the market and social incentives of entry. This is the novelty of the paper, which to the best of our
knowledge remained unexplored in the literature.
Our results show that if the network goods are fully incompatible, entry is socially insufficient if the entry
cost is high, the goods are sufficiently differentiated, and the degree of network externalities is low. Otherwise,
entry is socially excessive. However, when the network goods are fully compatible, entry is always socially
insufficient for all degrees of network externality as long as the entry cost is high and the goods are sufficiently
differentiated. Our findings provide guidelines to the policymakers whether to adopt an anticompetitive or a
procompetitive policy to regulate an industry that produces network goods.
The intuitions behind our results are as follows. The business stealing effect discussed in Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) that promotes entry and the degree of product differentiation that discourages entry in the
presence of scale economies, remain in our case. There is though an additional effect, the net effect of network
size, that arises from network externality and network compatibility. The network size effect has contradicting
implications on the social desirability of entry. First, if the degree of network externality is strong, it makes entry
attractive by increasing the profit of each entrant via consumer's expectations. On the other hand, market entry
incentives are not as strong since a rise in network size also increases consumers’ welfare that in turn, increases
the social welfare. This makes entry more socially desirable than what the market allows. Whether the network
effect on an entrant's profit is more substantial than its impact on social welfare, that is, whether network
externality incentivizes more (less) firms to enter the market than what is socially optimal depends on whether
the network goods are fully incompatible (compatible). In summary, whether entry is socially excessive or
insufficient largely depends on the relative strengths of these three effects.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 includes the analysis
of the market competition stage. Section 4 presents an integer case example that illustrates our main findings.
Section 5 analyses the entry stage for fully incompatible, fully compatible and partially compatible network
goods and includes our main results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 | THE MODEL
Consider an economy with a large number of identical firms. If a firm decides to enter into the market, it incurs
a fixed entry cost, F > 0, and a marginal production cost, ≥c 0. The firms that have entered into the market
produce horizontally differentiated goods that exhibit positive network externalities. We assume that the re-
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where m is the numeraire good, qi is the output of firm i and yi is the consumer's expectation regarding firm i's
total sales, with ≠i j i j, = 1,2, …, . The degree of product substitutability is measured by γ, ≤ ≤γ0 1, which
ranges from zero (independent goods) to unity (perfect substitutes). The strength of network externality is
measured by the parameter ∈n (0,1). A higher value of n implies stronger network externality, whereas n = 0
corresponds to the usual nonnetwork goods. Finally, the compatibility between the network goods is measured
by ∈θ [0,1], which ranges from zero (totally incompatible goods) to unity (perfectly compatible goods). Without
loss of generality, we normalize the total mass of consumers to unity.
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with ≠i j i j, = 1,2, …, . In line with Economides (1996) and Hoernig (2012), the network externalities enter additively
in the inverse demand function. This implies that if n > 0, the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the good
increases with the increase in consumers’ expectations regarding total sales of all firms, provided that the goods are
compatible θ( > 0). The extent of this increase depends both on the degree of network compatibility and the strength of
network externality. However, when the goods are incompatible (θ = 0), the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay
for a good depends exclusively on the sales of the firm producing that good.
We consider a two‐stage game with observable actions. At stage 1 the firms decide simultaneously whether to enter
or not into the market. At stage 2 consumers form expectations regarding the sales of all firms. At the same time, the
firms simultaneously choose their quantities and then the respective profits are realized. We employ subgame per-
fectness to solve the game.
We assume that the following condition holds throughout our analysis:




and (ii) γ nθ>
Assumption 1 ensures that at least one firm will enter into the market. Note that Assumption 1(ii) is always satisfied
as long as ≤θ γ, that is, whenever the degree of network compatibility is lower or equal to the degree of product
substitutability. For higher values of θ, it requires that the network externality is not too high, n < γ
θ
. To present our
results in a more concise manner, we set f = F
a c−
, with c a< .
3 | THE MARKET COMPETITION STAGE
At Stage 2, firms simultaneously choose their quantities, each to maximize its gross (from the entry cost F) profits. If
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The best response function of firm i shifts out with an increase in consumers’ expectations about its own output.
Moreover, whenever θ > 0, it also shifts out with an increase in consumers’ expectations about its rivals’ output, with
this shift being larger, the higher is the degree of network compatibility. Notice also that whenever the goods are not
perfectly compatible θ( < 1), consumers’ expectations about firm i's output result in a larger shift in its best response
function than their expectations about its rivals’ total output.
Solving the system of best response functions, and assuming, as in Katz and Shapiro (1985), that the consumers’
expectations satisfy “rational expectations” in equilibrium, that is, y q i k= , = 1,2, ..,i i , we get each firm's equilibrium
output and price for a given number of firms entering the market:
q k
a c
n k γ nθ
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−
(2 − ) + ( − 1)( − )
,⁎ (4)
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Note that the firm's equilibrium output, price and net profit are decreasing in γ, and increasing in n and θ. By
Assumption 1(ii), they are also decreasing in k.
We now determine social welfare for a given number of entering firms. Social welfare (W) constitutes of producer
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Then social welfare for a given number of entering firms k is
W k
k a c n γ nθ k
n k γ nθ
kF.( ) =
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Note that, similar to the firms’ equilibrium profit, social welfare is decreasing in γ, and increasing in n and θ.
4 | AN ILLUSTRATION: THE INTEGER CASE
In markets with network externalities, there is often one dominant or a few dominant firms. This may be
due to high entry costs. It is then natural to ask whether there is socially insufficient or excessive entry in such
markets. To illustrate our main findings, we consider an example with a few firms operating in the free entry
market equilibrium and examine whether this market structure is preferable from the point of view of social
welfare.
The number of firms in the free entry market equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions: (i) when k
firms have entered into the market, each makes nonnegative profits: ≥π k F( )⁎ and (ii) when k+1 firms have entered
into the market, each makes strictly negative profits: π k F( + 1) <⁎ . It is easy to check that k⁎ firms enter into the
market if and only if, ≤f<
n k γ nθ n k γ nθ
1
2− + ( − )
1
2− + ( − 1)( − )⁎ ⁎
. Further, using (9) we can get the respective lower and
upper bound values of f for which kW is the socially optimal number of firms.5
First, assume that there is full incompatibility between the network goods (θ = 0). Let γ = 0.5 and n = 0.1.
Figure 1a shows the free entry market equilibrium and the socially optimal number of firms for various values of the
(normalized) entry cost f. There is insufficient entry for all ≤f0.417 < 0.434, while there is excessive entry for all
≤f0.325 < 0.345. Moreover, it can be checked that for n = 0.2, the region of insufficient entry shrinks
( ≤f0.435 < 0.438), while that of excessive entry expands ( ≤f0.321 < 0.357). Finally, for n = 0.3, there is never
insufficient entry. The above indicates that for a lower degree of network externality, insufficient (excessive) entry
occurs in a larger (smaller) interval of values of the entry cost.
Next, assume that there is full compatibility between the network goods (θ = 1). Let again γ = 0.5 and n = 0.1.
Figure 1b shows the free entry market equilibrium and the socially optimal number of firms for various values
of f. There is insufficient entry for all ≤f0.435 < 0.471 as well as for all ≤f0.370 < 0.371, while there is excessive
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entry for all ≤f0.303 < 0.323. Moreover, it can be checked that for n = 0.2, the region of insufficient entry expands
( ≤f0.476 < 0.520 and ≤f0.417 < 0.427), while that of excessive entry shrinks ( ≤f0.360 < 0.370). A similar
pattern occurs when we compare the n = 0.3 with the n = 0.2 case. The above indicates that network compatibility
plays a crucial role for the likelihood of insufficient or excessive entry as the network externality becomes more
prominent. In particular, when θ = 0 as n increases, insufficient entry is less likely to occur, while for θ = 1 the
opposite is true.
The above observations that have been obtained with specific numerical examples are of a more general nature as
the analysis below reveals.
5 | THE ENTRY STAGE
At Stage 1, firms decide whether to enter or not into the market. As common in the literature, we consider the number
of firms as a continuous variable. Hence entry in the market occurs as long as the net profit of a firm is nonnegative.
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By Assumption 1, k > 1⁎ . As expected, if the entry cost falls or the degree of product differentiation rises, the free
entry equilibrium number of firms k⁎ increases. Moreover, k⁎ increases with θ and n. Intuitively, the higher the degree
of network compatibility or the degree of network externality, the more the market incentivises firms to enter.
From (11), we get each firm's equilibrium output and price, q f a c= ( − )⁎ and p c f a c= + ( − )⁎ , which are both
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As expected, aggregate industry output is decreasing in f and γ, and increasing in n and θ.
FIGURE 1 (a) Social efficiency of entry under
θ = 0, γ = 0.5, n=0.1 and (b) social efficiency of
entry under θ γ n= 1, = 0.5, and = 0.1 [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Next, we determine the welfare maximizing number of firms. In line with the existing literature, we consider the
second‐best problem of welfare maximization, that is, we determine the welfare maximizing number of firms condi-
tional on Cournot market behavior. This means that the social planner may regulate the number of firms entering into
the market, but is unable to control the firms’ behavior in the product market.
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To get better insights, we consider the two extreme cases of network compatibility
among goods, that is, full incompatibility (θ = 0)6 and full compatibility (θ = 1).
5.1 | Network incompatibility
First, consider the case in which the network goods are fully incompatible (θ = 0). It can be checked that social welfare
is a strictly quasi‐concave function of k. In particular, it is strictly concave in k if ≤n γ+ 1. While if n γ+ > 1, welfare
is strictly concave for all ≡k k γ n< ( , )n γ n γ
γ n γ c
(4− − )(2− − )
( + − 1)
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Entry is socially insufficient (excessive) if and only if the above derivative is positive (negative). Our findings are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
(i) Entry is socially excessive for all n if f < 1
4
, or ≥f 1
4











4 − 1− 2 + 1
2 + 1
The intuition goes as follows. Entry creates three effects. First, in line with Mankiw and Whinston (1986), entry
creates a business stealing effect by lowering the outputs and gross (from the entry cost) profits of the incumbent firms.
This boosts entry. Second, horizontally differentiated goods create a love‐for‐variety effect. As consumers value variety,
each marginal entrant increases social welfare more than the increase in its own profit. This leads to less entry than it is
socially desirable. And third, a net effect of network size that as discussed below has an ambiguous effect on the social
desirability of entry.
The network size (as reflected by both network externality and network compatibility), in our model, creates a
conflicting effect on the marginal entrant's profit and social welfare. On one hand, as observed by Economides (1996),
an increase in network externality widens the market of each firm via consumers’ expectations. This encourages more
firms to enter into the market to appropriate a higher profit by charging a higher price and selling larger quantities.
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We call this a positive network size effect. On the other hand, a rise in network externality also increases consumers’
welfare, which results in an increase in social welfare. This leads to less entry than what is socially desirable. We call
this a negative network size effect. As we will see below, the net effect of network size on social desirability of entry is
ambiguous and depends on both the degree of network externality and network compatibility.
Let us begin with the case where the entry cost is low f( < )1
4
, meaning that the product market is sufficiently
competitive. Each new entrant creates a significant business stealing effect by reducing the profit of the incumbents.
Under full network incompatibility, it also creates a small net effect of network size by widening the overall market
size. These two effects dominate the love‐for‐variety effect, resulting in more entry than what is socially desirable.
Moreover, when the entry cost is high ≥f( )1
4




, the love‐for‐variety effect
is weak. The business stealing effect and the net effect of network size are still prominent, and entry is excessive in this
case too.




and the entry cost be high ≥f( )1
4
. If the degree of
network externality is sufficiently large n n( > )⁎ , it strengthens both the positive and negative network size effects.
However, as the network goods are fully incompatible (θ = 0), the representative consumer's benefit and hence, the
increase in social welfare (negative network size effect) arising from increased network size is small compared to the
marginal entrant's benefit in profit (positive network size effect). Furthermore, when the network externality is strong,
entry shifts out the demand functions for all firms, which indirectly intensifies the business stealing effect by increasing
the market share of the incumbent firms. As a result, a socially excessive number of firms enter the market as the
positive network size and the business‐stealing effects dominate the love‐for‐variety and the negative network size
effects. On the other hand, the lower the degree of network externality, relatively weaker is the business stealing effect
and the less the entrants and the consumers benefit from the network size. Therefore, when n n< ⁎, the love‐for‐variety
and the negative network size effects overshadow the positive network size and the business stealing effects. As a
result, the free entry equilibrium number of firms becomes socially insufficient.
A straightforward implication of Proposition 1 is that when goods are homogenous (γ = 1), entry is always
socially excessive. This is in line with Mankiw and Whinston (1986). When the firms produce homogenous goods,
market competition is fierce, intensifying the business stealing effect that promotes entry. In contrast, the love‐for‐
variety effect that discourages entry disappears. Firms also benefit through the net effect of network size and as a
result, entry is socially excessive. Thus, the findings of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) are robust when there exists
network externality.
5.2 | Full network compatibility
Next, assume that there is full compatibility between the network goods (θ = 1). It can be checked that social welfare is
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Our findings are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.
(i) Entry is socially excessive for all n if f < 1
4








(ii) Otherwise, it is socially insufficient for all n.
The intuition behind Proposition 2(i) is along the lines stated in Proposition 1. Interestingly, when the entry cost is
high and the network goods are sufficiently differentiated, entry is socially insufficient for all degrees of network
externalities (Proposition 2(ii)). The reasoning is as follows. When the network goods are perfectly compatible (θ = 1),
the effect of network externality on the marginal entrant's profit and social welfare becomes a lot stronger than that
where the network goods are perfectly incompatible (θ = 0). The goods being perfectly compatible, the consumers’
utility, in this case, increases more than its expenditure followed by an increase in network size. As a result, the social
welfare increases more than the entrant's profit. This implies that the negative network size effect, together with the
love‐for‐variety effect, overshadow the business stealing and positive network size effects, resulting in socially
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insufficient entry. Therefore, as established in Section 4, an increase in network compatibility increases the likelihood
of insufficient entry.
In this case too, entry is socially excessive whenever the network goods are perfect substitutes.
5.3 | The general network compatibility case
We now return to the general case in which network goods are imperfectly compatible ( θ0 < < 1). Using similar
arguments as in the full incompatibility case, it turns out that social welfare is a strictly quasi‐concave function of k.7
Then by (13), we get the following result:
Proposition 3.
(i) Entry is socially excessive for all n and θ if f < 1
4
, or ≥f 1
4





(ii) Otherwise, entry is socially insufficient for all n if θ >
f γ
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Proposition 3 asserts our findings in Propositions 1 and 2 and highlights the role of network compatibility θ. When
the entry cost is low, entry is always socially excessive. This also holds when the entry cost is higher and the network
goods are not too differentiated (Proposition 3(i)). In contrast, as Proposition 3(ii) states, for high entry cost and
sufficiently differentiated goods, entry is often socially insufficient. In particular, if the network compatibility is high,
entry is always socially insufficient, while if it is low the degree of network externality should be low too.
The intuition is as follows. Recall that the free entry equilibrium number of firms k⁎ increases with the degree of
network compatibility θ. An increase in the degree of network compatibility and hence, a rise in network size, clearly,
encourages more firms to enter into the market to appropriate a higher profit by charging a higher price and selling
larger quantities. On the other hand, the consumers’ welfare rises as they value closely related network goods. This
improves social welfare. As follows, each marginal entrant increases social welfare more than the increase in its own
profit when the degree of network compatibility is high. As a result, it is more likely that entry becomes socially
insufficient as the network compatibility increases.
6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
We analyze the role of network externalities in determining the social desirability of free entry. We demonstrate
that when the network goods are fully incompatible, entry is socially insufficient only if the entry cost is high, the
goods are highly differentiated, and the degree of network externality is low. Otherwise, entry is socially excessive.
We also show that when the network goods are fully compatible, entry is socially insufficient for all degrees
of network externality as long as the entry cost is high and the goods are sufficiently differentiated. Finally,
we confirm the Mankiw and Whinston (1986) socially excessive entry result in a homogenous good industry
characterized by network externalities.
The present model can be seen as a building block for the analysis of more general and policy relevant cases. There
are a few directions in which our work can be extended. A good starting point could be to consider standard regulatory
policies, such as tax policies that are imposed by the governments to improve social welfare. It is well known that
governments can use tax policies to improve a country's welfare by reducing the distortion created by imperfectly
competitive product markets. It has also been well documented in the literature that tax revenue in one sector may help
to reduce the tax burden in another sector. Hence, there can be a shadow cost of public funds. In this context, it would
be interesting to explore the impacts of tax policy and associated shadow cost on the social desirability of entry. In
addition, we are in an era of severe environmental concerns. One could, therefore, revisit the question of welfare
implications of entry in a polluting industry that poses environmental damage to the society. Finally, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no extension of the Dixit and Stiglitz model in the literature that incorporates network
8 | BASAK AND PETRAKIS
externalities. Developing such a model and using it for addressing the social desirability of entry is a promising avenue
for future research.
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